Following the World War ¥±, Germany undertook a process of military downsizing and established itself as a peaceful nation. However, the recent rapid changes in international affairs have led Germany once again onto the path of military buildup. The conflict between the United States and Europe over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense spending contributions, as well as Russia¡¯s invasion of Ukraine, has made Germany realize that it can no longer rely solely on NATO for its security. Against this backdrop, Germany¡¯s rearmament signals a new shift in the European security order.
Causes of German Rearmament
Professor Bai Byoung-inn of the Dept. of Political Science and International Relations at Kookmin University (KMU) explains Germany¡¯s rearmament as follows:
First, there is the conflict with the U.S. regarding the increase in NATO defense spending contributions. Beyond the question of how much should be spent, the fact that the U.S. has shown an overtly unilateral attitude even toward its long-standing European allies has sparked skepticism about the U.S. as a reliable partner. Europe, therefore, recognizes the need to secure independent defense capabilities in case the U.S. national interests¡¯ conflict with Europe¡¯s security needs.
Second, there is the growing anxiety over Russia¡¯s security threat, particularly in the context of the European self-reliance discourse that has spread across Europe since Russia invaded Ukraine.
Prof. Bai views Germany¡¯s declaration of rearmament as ¡°An expression of the awareness that it must confront Russia¡¯s threat, as well as a signal of its determination to break away from the past posture of depending entirely on the U.S. and NATO for security and defense matters.¡±
Germany¡¯s Moves
Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz established a ¢æ100 billion defense fund and in March of this year, passed a constitutional amendment to exempt defense spending from the national debt limit. The German government plans to raise its defense budget from ¢æ95 billion in 2025 to ¢æ162 billion by 2029, increasing defense spending as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 2.4% in 2025 to 3.5% in 2029.
In addition, the government announced its goal of raising overall defense-related expenditures, including investment in defense industry infrastructure, to around 5% of GDP, and increasing troop numbers from the current 180,000 to approximately 240,000.
Furthermore, in July of this year, Germany signed the Kensington Agreement, with the United Kingdom, pledging mutual military support and cooperation. Although there is some overlap with NATO¡¯s collective defense provision, the bilateral countries promulgated that the agreement further concretizes their shared commitment to European and transatlantic security. In addition, cooperation on nuclear weapons was also included in it. Following France¡¯s earlier conclusion of a similar treaty with Britain, Germany¡¯s participation means that Europe¡¯s three major powers are building a framework of mutual security cooperation independent of NATO.
Germany¡¯s Expanding Influence on European Security and France¡¯s Perspective
Germany¡¯s military buildup is expected to affect not only NATO but also the European Union¡¯s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Prof. Bai noted, ¡°While there is a possibility that the internal dynamics within NATO may shift, the share of the U.S. military power within NATO will remain overwhelmingly dominant for a considerable period even if Europe¡¯s independent defense capabilities are strengthened with Germany¡¯s participation.¡±
In particular, France¡¯s response is noteworthy. Traditionally, France has regarded Germany¡¯s military expansion as a potential threat, but this time, it has officially expressed a welcoming attitude. Prof. Bai explained, ¡°France has consistently advocated for European strategic autonomy, and since Germany¡¯s rearmament is viewed as a step toward that goal, France has taken a positive stance.¡± He added, ¡°One may question whether Germany¡¯s rearmament declaration points to a ¡®Germany for Europe¡¯ or, as in the past, a ¡®Europe for Germany.¡¯ However, it seems that France¡¯s welcoming stance stems from the judgment and expectation that the former—a Germany for Europe—is bound to prevail.¡±
The Domestic and International Implications of Germany¡¯s Rearmament
Regarding Germany¡¯s domestic situation, he assessed that ¡°There appears to be a high level of internal consensus on the decision to rearm.¡± Both former Chancellor Scholz of the Social Democratic Party and current the Christian Democrats and their sister party, the Christian Social Union have pursued a military buildup, and a stance confirmed by the constitutional amendment passed in the Bundestag this past March. He pointed out that the fundamental reason is a shared perception of the Russian threat.
Meanwhile, regarding the international situation, he pointed out that ¡°Following Germany¡¯s rearmament declaration, security cooperation among European countries is strengthening, while, as a countereffect, confrontation with Russia is inevitably intensifying.¡± Prof. Bai warned, ¡°The more Europe strengthens its cooperation in response to the Russian threat, the more unavoidable geopolitical confrontation becomes.¡± He predicted that although this confrontation will initially unfold on the battlefield in Ukraine, it is likely to take new forms in various regions regardless of how the war concludes. Ultimately, Germany¡¯s rearmament is a response to the instability in the international order caused by Russia¡¯s invasion. However, it could also act as a factor that further exacerbates this instability in the medium to short term.
The EU, which has long advocated for lasting peace, and Germany, which has pursued military downsizing, have now embarked on a new path of security enhancement. Does Germany¡¯s rearmament imply that the world can no longer expect lasting peace? Germany is also expected to propose amendments to its military service law this year, drawing international attention to its future actions.
By Park Min-a | pmina0124@chungbuk.ac.kr
By Kim Seo-yeon | ssung@chungbuk.ac.kr